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Abstract
Under a revenue-sharing contract, a retailer pays a supplier a wholesale price for each unit purchased,
plus a percentage of the revenue the retailer generates. Such contracts have become more prevalent in
the videocassette rental industry relative to the more conventional wholesale price contract. This paper
studies revenue-sharing contracts in a general supply chain model with revenues determined by each
retailer's purchase quantity and price. Demand can be deterministic or stochastic and revenue is
generated either from rentals or outright sales. Our model includes the case of a supplier selling to a
classical fixed-price newsvendor or a price-setting newsvendor. We demonstrate that revenue sharing
coordinates a supply chain with a single retailer (i.e., the retailer chooses optimal price and quantity) and
arbitrarily allocates the supply chain's profit. We compare revenue sharing to a number of other supply
chain contracts (e.g., buy-back contracts, price-discount contracts, quantity-flexibility contracts, salesrebate contracts, franchise contracts, and quantity discounts). We find that revenue sharing is equivalent
to buybacks in the newsvendor case and equivalent to price discounts in the price-setting newsvendor
case. Revenue sharing also coordinates a supply chain with retailers competing in quantities, e.g.,
Cournot competitors or competing newsvendors with fixed prices. Despite its numerous merits, we
identify several limitations of revenue sharing to (at least partially) explain why it is not prevalent in all
industries. In particular, we characterize cases in which revenue sharing provides only a small
improvement over the administratively cheaper wholesale price contract. Additionally, revenue sharing
does not coordinate a supply chain with demand that depends on costly retail effort. We develop a
variation on revenue sharing for this setting.
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Abstract
Under a revenue-sharing contract a supplier charges a retailer a wholesale
price per unit plus a percentage of the revenue the retailer generates from the
unit. The prevalence of this contract form has recently increased substantially in the video cassette rental industry relative to the more traditional
wholesale price contract. Revenue-sharing contracts have been credited with
allowing retailers to increase their stock of newly released movies, thereby
substantially improving the availability of popular movies. In a general
model we study how revenue-sharing contracts improve overall supply chain
performance and by how much they improve performance. We compare
revenue sharing to other contracts that enhance channel coordination, e.g.,
buy-back contracts and quantity-‡exibility contracts. We show that revenue sharing can coordinate systems (such as a newsvendor problem with
price-dependent demand) that those contracts cannot. We demonstrate that
revenue sharing can also coordinate systems with multiple competing retailers. Finally, we identify the limitations of revenue-sharing contracts to (at
least partially) explain why they are not prevalent in all industries.
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Demand for a movie newly released on video cassette typically starts o¤ high and tapers
o¤ rapidly. As a result, a retailer renting video cassettes faces a challenging capacity problem.
To illustrate, in a traditional sales agreement between a video retailer and his supplier, the
retailer purchases each copy of a tape for about $65 and collects about $3 per rental. Hence,
the retailer must rent a tape at least 22 times before earning a pro…t. Unfortunately, peak
demand for a given title rarely lasts more than ten weeks, so the retailer simply cannot
justify purchasing enough tapes to cover the initial peak demand entirely.
Blockbuster Inc., a large video retailer, was keenly aware of its peak demand problem.
The poor availability of new release videos was consistently a major customer complaint
(McCollum, 1998). A Time Warner Inc study reported that 20% of customers surveyed said
they were unable to rent the movie they wanted on a typical store visit (Shapiro, 1998a).
Poor forecasting would be one explanation. But while Blockbuster may underestimate demand for some titles, it is unlikely that Blockbuster consistently underestimated demand
across all movies (thereby leading it to purchase too few tapes consistently) since a sudden
change in industry demand did not occur. Nor is there any evidence that the availability
problem was due to poor execution (e.g., an ine¢cient process for returning tapes to circulation once they are returned to the store). The best explanation for the availability problem
is a misalignment of incentives. If Blockbuster were able to purchase tapes at marginal
cost (which is surely well below $65 per tape), Blockbuster could a¤ord to purchase many
more tapes and initial availability would improve dramatically. Of course, selling at cost is
unattractive to movie studios.
The solution came from changing the terms of sale. Starting in 1998 Blockbuster entered
into revenue-sharing agreements with the major studios. Blockbuster agreed to pay its
suppliers a portion (probably in the range of 30-45%) of its rental income in exchange for
a reduction in the initial price per tape from $65 to $8.1 If Blockbuster keeps half of the
rental income, the break-even point for a tape drops to approximately six rentals. With
those terms Blockbuster can clearly a¤ord to increase its purchase quantity and improve
1

Blockbuster’s terms are not public, but Rentrak, a video distributor, o¤ers the fol-

lowing: the studio gets 45% of the revenue, Rentrak 10%, and the retailer 45%. (See
www.rentrak.com). Since Blockbuster has agreements directly with the studios, it should
have at least as generous terms.
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customer service.
The impact of revenue sharing at Blockbuster has been dramatic. Revenue sharing increased rentals by as much as 75% in test markets (Shapiro, 1998b). In the year after
instituting revenue sharing Blockbuster increased its overall market share from 25% to 31%
and its cash ‡ow by 61% (Pope, 1999). To put that market share gain in perspective, the
second largest retailer, Hollywood Entertainment Corp, has a market share of about 5%
(Shapiro, 1998a). Blockbuster’s success has been so dramatic that independent video stores
have …led suit arguing that Blockbuster’s favorable terms are driving independent retail
store owners out of business (Pope, 1999).
This paper studies the impact of revenue sharing on the performance of a supply chain.
While inspired by the success of revenue sharing in the video industry, our model is quite
general. It applies to essentially any industry and any link between two levels in a supply
chain (e.g., supplier-manufacturer or manufacturer-distributor). It does not matter whether
the asset produced at the upstream level is rented at the downstream level (as in the video
industry) or sold outright (as in the book industry) or whether demand is stochastic or
deterministic.
We begin with the simplest supply chain. A downstream …rm, called the retailer, orders
q units of an asset from the upstream …rm, called the supplier. The supplier produces the q
units at a constant marginal cost, and the retailer uses those units to generate revenues over
a single selling season. In the marketing literature the revenue function is typically assumed
to be derived from a downward sloping, deterministic demand curve (see Lilien, Kotler
and Moorthy, 1992), whereas in the operations literature the revenue function is frequently
assumed to result from a newsvendor problem with a …xed retail price and stochastic demand
(see Tsay, Nahmias and Agrawal, 1998). We work with a general revenue function that
encompassed both of those models. It is well known that in this setting the supply chain’s
pro…t is less than optimal whenever the supplier charges a wholesale price above marginal
cost because then the retailer orders fewer units than optimal (Spengler, 1950). We show that
revenue sharing induces the retailer to order the supply chain optimal quantity, coordinating
the supply chain. It also can arbitrarily split pro…ts between the two …rms. Further, the
coordinating contract is independent of the revenue function. Consequently, one contract
can coordinate a supply chain with multiple independent retailers.
2

Two alternative contract types have been proposed to coordinate this supply chain when
the revenue function is generated from a newsvendor problem: buy-back contracts (Pasternack, 1985) and quantity-‡exibility contracts (Tsay, 1999). Those contracts also coordinate
the supply chain and arbitrarily divide pro…ts. We show that revenue sharing and buy-back
contracts are equivalent in this setting in the strongest sense. For any buy-back contract
there exists a revenue-sharing contract that generates the same cash ‡ows for any realization
of demand. (The comparable result does not hold between revenue sharing and quantity‡exibility contracts.) However, we also demonstrate that revenue sharing can coordinate
settings that buy back and quantity-‡exibility contracts do not.
We next consider two extensions to our basic model. In the …rst we study coordination
when demand is stochastic and the retailer chooses his order quantity and his price, i.e.,
the price-dependent newsvendor problem. Revenue sharing still coordinates the channel and
supports an arbitrary division of pro…ts. In the second extension we consider a supply chain
with one supplier and multiple competing retailers. The retailers could be Cournot competitors or competing newsvendors (as in Lippman and McCardle, 1997). It has been observed
in similar settings that the simple wholesale-price contract can coordinate this system (Mahajan and van Ryzin, 1999, and Bernstein and Federgruen, 1999), but the coordinating
wholesale price only allows one split of channel pro…t. We show that revenue sharing again
coordinates this system while supporting alternative pro…t allocations.
Based on these results, we conclude that revenue-sharing contracts are very e¤ective in
a wide range of supply chain settings. Nevertheless, revenue-sharing contracts must have
some limitations, otherwise we would expect to observe them in every industry. One limitation to revenue sharing is the additional administrative cost it imposes on the supply
chain. With revenue sharing the supplier must monitor the retailer’s revenues to verify
that the retailer indeed pays the supplier her appropriate share of the earned revenues.
The gains from coordination may not always cover these costs. To explore this idea, we
study the performance of the supply chain with the simpler wholesale-price contract, which
clearly has a lower administrative cost than revenue sharing. If supply chain performance
with the wholesale-price contract is relatively close to optimal and if the supplier earns a
signi…cant fraction of the supply chain’s pro…t, administrative costs may prevent the adoption of revenue-sharing contracts. We demonstrate that there is considerable variation in the
3

e¢ciency of the wholesale-price contract (the ratio of supply chain pro…t with the wholesaleprice contract to the optimal pro…t). We conclude that the administrative cost burden can
explain why revenue sharing is not implemented in some settings, but that is not a su¢cient
explanation for all settings.
We also explore a second limitation based on the hypothesis that retail e¤ort in‡uences
demand. In particular, we assume that there are many activities that a retailer performs that
increase demand, yet are costly: cleaner stores, more and better-trained sta¤, etc. We show
that while revenue sharing helps to coordinate the retailer’s quantity decision, it actually
works against coordinating the retailer’s e¤ort decision. If retail e¤ort has a su¢ciently
large impact on demand, the supplier is better o¤ using a wholesale-price contract instead
of a revenue-sharing contract.
We are not the only academics that have been attracted to revenue sharing by the recent
media attention. Dana and Spier (1999) consider the use of revenue sharing in a supply chain
with a perfectly competitive downstream market and stochastic demand. They demonstrate
that a revenue-sharing contract can induce the downstream …rms to choose supply chain
optimal actions. Our model does not rely on perfect competition or stochastic demand.
Pasternack (1999) considers a model in which a supplier sells to a retailer that faces a
newsvendor problem. The retailer can purchase units under a traditional contract as well
as purchase units under a revenue-sharing agreement, where revenue sharing is modeled as
a …xed payment to the supplier per unit sold. The supplier sets the terms of the revenuesharing contract but the terms of the traditional contract are exogenous. In our model, the
supplier o¤ers only revenue sharing based on a percentage of revenue, and we consider a
more general setting than the newsvendor problem. For the newsvendor problem, we show
that our contract is equivalent to his.
The next section outlines the model. Section 2 investigates channel coordination and
the relationship between revenue-sharing contracts and several other contracts. Section 3
extends our results to settings beyond our basic model. Section 4 discusses limitations of
revenue-sharing contracts. The …nal section discusses our results and concludes.

1.

Basic Model

Consider a supply chain with two risk neutral …rms. The supplier is the upstream …rm
4

and the retailer is the downstream …rm. The supplier sells an asset to the retailer, which
allows the retailer to generate revenues over a selling season. For now, assume that the
retailer’s expected revenue over the selling season R (q) is solely a function of q, the number
of units purchased from the supplier. (Since the …rms are risk neutral, there is no need in our
analysis to distinguish between expected revenue and realized revenue. To streamline the
exposition, all discussion of revenue is assumed to refer to expected revenue.) Assume that
R(q) is strictly concave and di¤erentiable for q ¸ 0. Without loss of generality, normalize
the salvage value per unit at the end of the selling season to zero. We make no distinction
between the case in which the retailer rents the asset and ends the season with q units and
the case in which the retailer sells the asset. The supplier’s production cost per unit is c > 0.
We assume that the product is viable in the market, i.e., R0 (0) > c, and a …nite production
quantity is optimal, i.e., R0 (1) < c:
Transactions between the retailer and supplier are governed by a revenue-sharing contract.
This contract contains two parameters, Á and w. The …rst, Á; is the share of retail revenue
the retailer keeps, i.e., given retail revenues R(q), the retailer must transfer (1¡Á)R(q) to the
supplier but retains the remaining ÁR (q). It is natural to assume Á 2 [0; 1], even though that
restriction is not strictly required. We do not include in our model the administrative costs
associated with monitoring revenues and collecting transfers. In other words, we assume the
cost of implementation has no impact on the contract the supplier o¤ers or the quantity the
retailer purchases. (Implementation costs, of course, may impact whether revenue sharing
is adopted at all; see below.) The second parameter in a revenue-sharing contract, w ¸ 0; is
the wholesale price. This is the amount the retailer pays the supplier per unit. Note that a
standard wholesale-price contract is a revenue-sharing contract with Á = 1:
In this game the following events occur: the supplier determines and announces the
terms of the revenue-sharing contract; the retailer orders q units and pays the supplier wq;
the supplier produces and delivers q units; the retailer receives revenue R(q) and transfers
(1 ¡ Á) R (q) to the supplier. Each …rm maximizes its expected pro…t given that the other
…rm does the same. All information in this game is common knowledge to both …rms.

2.

Analysis

We begin with the integrated channel solution, the decisions that maximize total supply
5

chain pro…t. We next consider the retailer’s order quantity decision for a given revenuesharing contract and identify the supplier’s optimal revenue-sharing contract. We conclude
with a comparison between revenue-sharing contracts and two other well known contracts
for coordinating supply chains: buy-back contracts and quantity-‡exibility contracts.
2.1

Integrated channel

Total supply chain pro…t given an order quantity q is ¦(q);
¦(q) = R(q) ¡ qc:
Since R(q) is concave and R0 (0) ¸ c, the optimal order quantity qI is positive and satis…es
R0 (qI ) = c:
2.2

(1)

Actions with a revenue-sharing contract

The retailer’s pro…t function with a revenue-sharing contract is ¼ r (q);
¼ r (q) = ÁR(q) ¡ qw:
Assume R0 (0) > w=Á; so the retailer’s optimal order quantity, qb; must satisfy
ÁR0 (b
q ) = w:

The retailer’s optimal order quantity equals qI when the wholesale price is w(Á) = Ác:
It follows that the supplier coordinates the channel by selling below cost, i.e., w(Á) · c.
Naturally, a supplier should certainly be skeptical of any scheme that requires him to sell at
a loss. As we will see, this is not a problem for the supplier.
If the supplier o¤ers a coordinating contract, fÁ; w(Á)g ; the retailer’s pro…t is
¼ r (qI ) = ÁR(qI ) ¡ qI c = Á¦(qI ):
Hence, Á is not just the fraction of revenue the retailer keeps, but also the fraction of supply
chain pro…t she receives. The supplier captures the remaining pro…t:
¼ s (qI ; w(Á); Á) = (1 ¡ Á)¦(qI ):
Thus, with revenue sharing the supplier can maximize total supply chain pro…t and take any
share of that pro…t for herself. As a result, the supplier is willing to sell below cost because
she earns a positive pro…t and potentially the supply chain’s maximum pro…t.
The mechanics of coordination through revenue sharing are illustrated in Figure 1. Here
6

we show the marginal revenue curve for the integrated channel, R0 (q) ; as well as the marginal
cost curve, which is a horizontal line at c. The optimal quantity is found at qI where these
curves intersect, and the pro…t of the integrated channel is the area a1 between these curves.
The marginal revenue curve for a retailer under a revenue-sharing contract, ÁR0 (q) ; is
also shown. It is everywhere below the system’s marginal revenue curve. The corresponding
marginal cost curve Ác is similarly below the system cost curve so the optimum remains at qI .
The retailer’s pro…t is the area a2 and the supplier’s pro…t is a1 minus a2 . The retailer’s pro…t
decreases as Á decreases: as Á decreases the retailer’s cost decreases at rate cqI = R0 (qI )qI ;
Rq
but the retailer’s revenue decreases at a faster rate, 0 I R0 (x)dx, since R0 (q) is a decreasing

function. Thus, total supply chain pro…t is held constant as Á decreases (assuming w(Á) is
the wholesale price) but the allocation of pro…ts shifts towards the supplier.
Figure 1 illustrates that coordination with revenue sharing involves shifting down both
the marginal revenue curve and the marginal cost curve while maintaining their intersection
at qI . Of course, it is also possible to achieve this objective by shifting only one of the

curves. A quantity discount policy does exactly that (Jeuland and Shugan, 1983). As
shown by Moorthy (1987) any total cost schedule c (q) that satis…es c0 (q) < R0 (q) for q < qI ;
c0 (qI ) = R0 (qI ) and c0 (q) > R0 (q) for q > qI , coordinates the channel without altering
the retailer’s revenue function. To shift pro…t to the supplier it is su¢cient to increase
c0 (q) for q < qI while abiding by the condition that c0 (q) < R0 (q). Although the quantity
discount scheme can e¤ectively coordinate the action of a single retailer, it encounters a
problem if the supplier sells to more than one independent retailer. If qI is not constant
across retailers (say, because they face heterogenous demand functions), it is unlikely that
the same quantity discount schedule coordinates the action of every retailer because the
coordinating discount schedule is not independent of the marginal revenue curve. With
revenue sharing the coordinating contract is independent of the marginal revenue curve,
and so the same revenue sharing contract coordinates the actions of heterogenous retailers.
The particular Á chosen depends on the …rm’s relative bargaining power, but it is clear
that they should agree to coordinate the channel. It is always possible to divide a larger
pie in such a way that each …rm’s piece is increased. While the model does not restrict
the supplier from expropriating the supply chain’s entire pro…t, that outcome is admittedly
neither reasonable nor expected. As Á approaches zero, the retailers’ pro…t function becomes
7

quite ‡at about qI ; which leaves the retailer with little incentive to in fact choose the optimal
quantity. (On a percentage basis any deviation may have a large impact on pro…ts, but little
impact on an absolute basis.) According to our theory the retailer will choose qI if he has
some incentive to choose qI ; but in reality a supplier should think twice before o¤ering the
retailer a contract that leaves the retailer with only a small fraction of his revenues.
There is another approach to show that revenue sharing coordinates the supply chain with
a single retailer. Proposition 4 in Caldentey and Wein (1999) states that a set of transfer
payments coordinates a system if (roughly speaking) each player transfers a constant fraction
of its utility to each other player and the fractions sum to one. De…ne the retailer’s utility
to be R(q) and the supplier’s utility to be ¡cq.2 With revenue sharing, the retailer transfers
to the supplier (1 ¡ Á)R(q) and the supplier transfers to the retailer ¡wq; where a negative
transfer implies a payment from the retailer to the supplier. (While awkward, a negative
transfer payment is allowed by their theory.) When w = Ác; the ratio of the retailer’s
transfer to his utility is (1 ¡ Á) and the comparable ratio for the supplier is Á. Since those
fraction indeed sum to one, the proposition applies when w = Ác.
2.3

Comparison with buy-back contracts

Buy backs are perhaps the most commonly studied contract in the supply chain contracting
literature. Under such a contract, the supplier sells units to a retailer at the start of the
season for wb per unit and agrees to purchase left over units at the end of the selling season
for b per unit, b < wb . Pasternack (1985) was the …rst to show that not only does a buyback contract coordinate the supply chain with a supplier selling to an independent retailer
solving a newsvendor problem, it also supports an arbitrary division of pro…ts. His work has
since been extended by a number of authors (e.g., Kandel, 1996; Marvel and Peck, 1995;
and Donohue, 1996). We now show that a coordinating buy-back contract in a newsvendor
problem is equivalent to our coordinating revenue-sharing contract fÁ; w(Á)g = fÁ; Ácg.
Following Pasternack (1985), we suppose that there is a single selling period and that
2

Technically, Caldentey and Wein (1999) assume voluntary compliance (Cachon and Lar-

iviere, 2000) so the supplier may not …ll the retailer’s order qr . However, if the supplier’s
utility is ¡cqs if the supplier’s action is qs ¸ qr and ¡2cqr otherwise, qs = qr is a dominant
strategy. The retailer may act as if the supplier is required to supply qr .
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demand is given by a probability distribution F (x) : The retail price is …xed at p. If the
supplier o¤ers a buy-back contract fb; wb g, the retailer’s pro…t function is
µ
¶
Z q
Z q
¼r (q; wb ; b) = p q ¡
F (x)dx + b
F (x)dx ¡ wb q
0
0
µ
¶
Z q
= (p ¡ b) q ¡
F (x)dx ¡ (wb ¡ b)q

(2)

0

The retailer’s optimal order q^ is found from the critical fractile F (^
q ) = (p ¡ w) = (p ¡ b). In
contrast, the pro…t of an integrated system is
µ
¶
Z q
¦ (q) = p q ¡
F (x)dx ¡ cq

(3)

0

and the system optimal order quantity is determined by
F (qI ) = (p ¡ c) =p:

(4)

Suppose the supplier o¤ers:
b¤ = p (1 ¡ Á)

wb¤ = p (1 ¡ Á) + Ác:

The decentralized channel then faces the same critical fractile as the integrated channel,
¡ ¢
and the retailer’s pro…t when stocking q I is Á¦ q I : This coordinating buy-back contract
thus results in the same split of expected channel pro…ts as the coordinating revenue-sharing

contract fÁ; Ácg. The relationship between the two is actually deeper. As can be seen from
(2), a buy back is equivalent to reducing the retailer’s cost of purchasing a unit to (wb ¡ b)

while also reducing the fraction of revenue he keeps to (p ¡ b)=p. Since (wb¤ ¡ b¤ ) = Ác and
(p ¡ b¤ )=p = Á, the two contracts result in the same realized pro…ts for the retailer and
supplier for any realization of demand.
Consequently, for a newsvendor problem with a …xed retail price, the supplier has two
ways of implementing revenue sharing. She can either require a percentage of realized
revenue or she can demand a …xed payment per unit sold (as in Pasternack, 1999). The
approaches are equivalent. Dana and Spier (1999) note that the same is true in their model
as well. However, this equivalence does not hold in general. Below we present an example
that buy backs cannot coordinate but that proportion-based revenue sharing can.
2.4

Comparison with quantity-‡exibility contracts

While buy backs are a special case of revenue sharing, the same is not true for all coordinating
supply chain contracts. Consider the quantity ‡exibility (QF) contract of Tsay and Lovejoy
9

(1999) and Tsay (1999). Here, the retailer purchases q units for w¢ per unit at the start
of the season and may return up to ¢q units at the end of the season for a full refund,
¢ 2 [0; 1]. As with the buy-back contract, let F (x) be the distribution function of demand
in the season and …x the retail price at p. The retailer’s expected pro…t is
µ
µ
¶
¶
Z q
Z q
¼ r (q; wq ; ¢) = p q ¡
F (x)dx ¡ wq q ¡
F (x)dx :
0

(5)

(1¡¢)q

The retailer’s problem is concave in q and the …rst order condition is

p (1 ¡ F (q)) = wq (1 ¡ F (q) + (1 ¡ ¢)F ((1 ¡ ¢)q)) :
The integrated channel’s …rst order condition is still (4). Thus, the retailer chooses the
integrated channel quantity when
c
:
1 ¡ F (qI ) + (1 ¡ ¢)F ((1 ¡ ¢)qI )
Tsay (1999) shows that as ¢ goes to one, w¢ goes to p and all pro…ts go to the supplier.
w¢ =

While QF and revenue sharing can achieve similar splits of expected pro…ts, several
distinctions keep them from being equivalent. For example, with the QF contract w¢ ¸ c
for all values of ¢ whereas with revenue sharing w · c. Additionally, the coordinating price
w¢ is not independent of the demand distribution, whereas w(Á) = Ác is. The driver of these
di¤erences can be seen by examining (5). The …rst term is the retailer’s revenue. It does
not vary with ¢ for a …xed q. Any coordinating QF contract leaves the retailer’s revenue
unchanged. Pro…ts are shifted from the retailer to the supplier by raising the retailer’s
marginal cost at every point except qI ; hence, w¢ > c. Under revenue sharing, pro…ts are
shifted to the supplier by lowering marginal revenue at every point while coordination is
assured by simultaneously reducing marginal cost, necessitating w (Á) < c.

3.

Model Extensions

We now explore other market settings that can be coordinated through revenue-sharing contracts. We …rst consider a newsvendor problem with price-dependent demand and show that
revenue sharing can coordinate both decisions. We then examine a setting in which retailers
compete for customers and demonstrate that a revenue-sharing contract can coordinate the
system and support alternative divisions of supply chain pro…ts.

10

3.1

Price-dependent newsvendor

The setting is the same as in section 2.3 but now the retail price p is also a decision variable. Demand is governed by a known distribution F (x; p) such that for any p1 > p2 ,
F (x; p1 ) > F (x; p2 ) : Charging a higher retail price consequently leads to a stochastically
smaller market. Petruzzi and Dada (1999) provide a recent review of such models. Here,
we assume that the integrated supply chain has a unique optimal quantity and price pair,
fqI ; pI g that results in a pro…t of ¦ (qI ; pI ).
To see that revenue sharing can lead an independent retailer to implement fqI ; pI g, note
that his pro…t function given a revenue-sharing contract fÁ; wg can be written as
µ µ
¶
¶
Z q
w
F (x; p)dx ¡ q :
¼ r (q; p; w; Á) = Á p q ¡
Á
0
The integrated channel pro…t function ¦(q; p) is as given in (3) except that p is now a
decision variable. Thus, when w = Ác;
¼ r (q; p; w; Á) = Á¦(q; p);
and the retailer optimizes his pro…t by ordering the supply chain’s optimal quantity qI and
setting the supply chain’s optimal price pI .3
We consequently have that the contract that coordinates a channel facing a newsvendor
problem with an exogenous retail price also coordinates a newsvendor problem with an
endogenous retail price. This result is all the more remarkable because Emmons and Gilbert
(1998) have shown that buy-back contract with a …xed buy-back rate b (equivalently, revenue
sharing with a …xed per unit payment) cannot coordinate such a system. (It is not di¢cult
to show that a quantity-‡exibility contract also does not coordinate this system.)

Our

proportional scheme works because the coordinating contract is independent of the retail
price; the decentralized channel picks the same quantity as the integrated system for any
retail price. With buy backs, the coordinating contract depends on the retail price. Given
3

Note that demonstrating coordination does not depend on the speci…cs of the price-

dependent newsvendor problem. A similar argument consequently su¢ces for any system
in which revenue is a function of price and quantity and costs are linear in quantity. For
example, the revenue function could be generated from a queuing model in which the demand rate depends on price and average service time, and the latter depends on the chosen
capacity/processing rate.
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a …xed buy-back rate, the decentralized channel picks the right quantity for only one retail
price. The contract consequently lacks the ‡exibility to coordinate both actions.
3.2

Competing retailers

We now extend our basic model and allow for more than two …rms. Speci…cally, we suppose
that there is still a single supplier but that sales occur through n distinct locations. Denoting
the vector of stocking levels as q¹ = fq1 ; : : : ; qn g, the revenue at location i is Ri (¹
q ) and the
revenue for the entire system is:
R (¹
q) =

n
X

Ri (¹
q) :

i=1

We assume that Ri (¹
q ) is continuous and that @ 2 Ri =@qi @qj · 0 for all j 6= i. Locations i
and j are thus substitutes since increasing the quantity at location j reduces the marginal
revenue (and hence total revenue) at i. Let q¹i0 = f0; : : : ; 0; qi ; 0; : : : ; 0g for i = 1; : : : ; n. We

also assume that there exists a …nite qi± such that @Ri (¹
qi0 ) =@qi < ± for all qi ¸ qi± for any

± > 0. That is, marginal revenue at i permanently drops below any positive number at a
…nite quantity level even if all other locations stock nothing.
A unit costs c > 0 regardless of the location where it is stocked. Denote the system
©
ª
q ) is unimodal in qi and
optimal vector of quantities as q¹I = q1I ; : : : ; qnI . We assume Ri (¹
that R (¹
q ) is su¢ciently well-behaved that q¹I is unique with qiI > 0 for all i. Previous

assumptions assure that qi¤ is …nite for all i. Assume that q¹I can be found from …rst order
conditions and thus satis…es the following system of equations:
¡ ¢ X i ¡ I¢
Rii q¹I +
Rj q¹ = c i = 1; :::; n;

(6)

j6=i

where Rji (¹
q) =

@Rj (¹
q)
.
@qi

¡ ¢
¡ ¢
P
Let ¦ q¹I = R q¹I ¡ c ni=1 q¹iI be the integrated system pro…t. In

a decentralized system, one of n independent retailers runs each location. Retailer i sets qi
to maximize his own pro…t without coordinating his decision with other retailers.

Although we have imposed some mathematical structure, our model is general enough
to capture a wide variety competitive situations. For example, if Ri (¹
q) is a deterministic
function such as

Ã

Ri (¹
q ) = qi 1 ¡ qi ¡ ¯

X
j6=i

qj

!

(7)

for 0 · ¯ < 1; we have a model of Cournot competition (Tirole, 1988, Tyagi, 1999). Alternatively, we could have competing newsvendors as studied by Parlar (1988) and Lippman and
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McCardle (1997). Also, while our formulation treats the retailers as competing in quantity,
an extension to price competition is straightforward.
We assume that the supplier can charge each retailer a unique price wi > 0 and look for
a Nash equilibrium in order quantities. Because a rational retailer will never set a quantity
that pushes his marginal revenue below his acquisition cost, the game is unchanged if we
restrict retailer i to choosing an order quantity from the interval [0; qiwi ]. Combined with our
earlier assumptions, this assures the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium q N (see
Theorem 1.2 of Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). Assuming that each element of q N is positive,
it can be found from the following system of equations:
¡ ¢
Rii q¹N = wi i = 1; :::; n:

(8)

In comparing (8) with (6), one sees that an immediate consequence of decentralization is
P
that the individual retailer does not account for the externality j6=i Rji (¹
q ) he imposes on

the rest of the system. Consequently, q¹I cannot be a Nash equilibrium if the supplier were
¡ ¢
to transfer at marginal cost; since Rii q¹I > c, retailer i would deviate to a higher quantity.
The supplier, of course, can reduce the incentive to raise the order quantity by raising
©
ª
the wholesale price. Suppose the supplier charges w¹ I = w1I ; : : : ; wnI where:
X ¡ ¢
wiI = c ¡
Rji q¹I
i = 1; :::; n:
j6=i

The two systems of equations (8) and (6) are now equivalent and q¹¤ is a Nash equilibrium.
The scheme works by charging retailer i for the marginal cost he imposes on the system –
both in production and externalities – at the system optimal quantity. Thus the non-linear
system cost that retailer i ignores:
Z qiI X
¡
¢
I
I
Rij q1I ; : : : ; qi¡1
; zi ; qi+1
; : : : ; qnI dzi
0

j6=i

is imposed on him via a linear proxy:

qi

X
j6=i

¡ ¢
Rji q¹I :

Because the cost imposed on retailer i is only an approximation, one cannot guarantee that
q¹I is a unique equilibrium when w
¹ I is charged.
Because Rji (¹
q ) · 0, wiI is greater than the marginal cost of production. Bernstein and
Federgruen (1999) present a related model in which coordination can also be achieved by
linear prices above the marginal cost of production. One consequence of pricing above cost
13

is that the supplier can both coordinate the system and earn a positive pro…t when selling
to competing retailers. However, wiI can only support one division of pro…ts:
n
X
X
¡ I I¢
¡ ¢
¼ s q¹ ; w¹
=
qiI
¡Rji q¹I
¡

I

¼ ri q¹ ; w¹

I

¢

i=1

j6=i

¡ ¢
= Ri q¹I ¡ qiI wiI

i = 1; :::; n:

Bernstein and Federgruen (1999) propose using lump sum transfer to achieve alternative
pro…t allocations. We now show that this can also be achieved through revenue sharing.
Suppose the supplier now o¤ers retailer i a revenue-sharing contract (Á; wi (Á)) for Á 2
[0; 1]. Assuming a constant Á across all retailers is solely for convenience. It is straightforward to verify that the su¢cient conditions for the existence of a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium still hold and that an equilibrium now must satisfy
¡ ¢
ÁRii q¹N = wi (Á) i = 1; :::; n:
³
¡ ¢´
P
Hence if wi (Á) = ÁwiI = Á c ¡ j6=i Rji q¹I ; q¹I can again be supported as a Nash equi-

librium. Retailer i’s pro…t is now
¡
¢
¡ ¡ ¢
¢
¡
¢
¼ ri q¹I ; Á; Áw¹ I = Á Ri q¹I ¡ qiI wi = Á¼ ri q¹I ; w¹ I :
¡
¢
It can be shown that ¼ ri q¹I ; w¹ I ¸ 0, so the retailer is willing to participate for any Á ¸ 0.
The supplier’s pro…t is now
¡
¢
¡ ¢
¡
¢
¼ s q¹I ; Á; Áw
¹ I = (1 ¡ Á) ¦ q¹I + Á¼ s q¹I ; w¹ I ;

a convex combination of the integrated system pro…t and what she would earn without
revenue sharing.
Thus our results for a single retailer carry over to competing retailers. Our analysis complements Dana and Spier (1999) who examine revenue sharing with competing newsvendors.
They assume perfect competition so retailers earn zero pro…ts regardless of the contract offered. We assume an oligopoly in which retailers earn positive returns as long as Á > 0.
There are several di¤erence between the single and multiple retailer settings that are worthy of mention. First, since the transfer price in the oligopoly case must account for competi³
¡ ¢´
P
tive externalities, wiI (Á) is greater than the cost of production for Á > c= c ¡ j6=i Rji q¹I .

Since wiI (1) > c; allowing the retailers to keep all of their revenue does not allow them to
¡ ¢ £ ¡ ¢
¡
¢¤
receive all system pro…ts. One would have to have Á = ¦ q¹I = ¦ q¹I ¡ ¼ s q¹I ; w¹ I > 1

to drop the supplier’s pro…t to zero. In the single retailer case, the coordinating whole14

sale price never exceeds c and transferring at cost allows the retailer to capture all pro…ts.
Next, the coordinating revenue-sharing contract is no longer independent of the system’s
revenue curve. Now, the terms o¤ered retailer i depend on the revenue function of every
other location. This is again driven by the need to account for competition. Finally, revenue
sharing is no longer equivalent to the coordination scheme of Caldentey and Wein (1999).
They assume exchanges are made between every agent. We assume all exchanges involve
the supplier. Their proposal thus requires a greater number of transactions.

4.

Limitations of revenue sharing

To this point we have presented a very favorable picture of revenue sharing. We have shown
that is a powerful tool capable of coordinating a variety of supply chain problems. Now we
argue the opposite case and o¤er some caveats on when to implement revenue sharing. We
focus on administrative costs and retailer moral hazard.
4.1

Administrative costs

Essential to implementing revenue sharing is the ability for the supplier to ex post verify
the retailer’s revenue, which we have supposed is costless. But that need not be the case
in practice. At a minimum, the channel would incur the cost of linking the supplier’s and
retailer’s information system. More likely, the supplier would have to monitor closely how
the downstream …rm manages the assets it has purchased.4
In many ways, a video retailer like Blockbuster is an ideal candidate for revenue sharing.
First, the assets (i.e., the video tapes) have a limited number of uses. Second, the chain
has essentially uniform prices and rental policies. Third, the individual stores already have
the technology in place to capture relevant information (e.g., whether all copies of a movie
are out) and report it to corporate level. Thus a movie studio should be able to monitor
Blockbuster’s revenue from a given title by merely linking to its corporate system. Contrast
this with the problem faced by the maker of machine tools selling equipment to a job
shop. To implement revenue sharing, the tool maker must know just how many lots were
4

The analysis of buy backs (Pasternack, 1985) and QF contracts (Tsay, 1999) similarly

ignore administrative expenses. Since these contracts also require monitoring retail sales,
their costs should be comparable to revenue sharing.
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processed through its equipment and the transaction price for each lot. Overcoming such
administrative costs could easily swamp any increase in the supplier’s earnings.
In general, a supplier must balance the costs of running revenue sharing with the pro…t
sacri…ced by using a non-coordinating contract. The simplest such contract is a wholesaleprice contract in which the supplier sets a …xed per-unit wholesale price and does not share
in the retailer’s revenue. Selling the product outright is then the only way the supplier earns
a pro…t. We now consider supply chain performance when the supplier sets the wholesale
price to maximize her own pro…t in both single and multi-retailer settings.
4.1.1

The single retailer case

Suppose there is a single retailer. Given a wholesale-price contract, the retailer’s optimal
order quantity is the unique solution to
R0 (q) ¡ w = 0;

(9)

if R0 (0) > w; otherwise the optimal order quantity is zero. Since R0 (q) is strictly decreasing,
there exists a function w(q) such that q is the retailer’s optimal order quantity when the
supplier charges the wholesale price w(q). From (9) it must be that w(q) = R0 (q): The
supplier’s pro…t can then be expressed as ¼ s (q);
¼ s (q) = q(w(q) ¡ c) = q (R0 (q) ¡ c) ;
and
¼ 0s (q) = w(q) ¡ c + qw 0 (q) = R0 (q) + qR00 (q) ¡ c:

(10)

The supplier’s pro…t function is unimodal in q if R0 (q) + qR00 (q) is decreasing in q. This is
equivalent to assuming that the elasticity of the retailer’s order decreases in q, so successive
percentage decreases in the wholesale price bring about smaller and smaller increases in
sales. For tractability, we assume that condition holds.5 Let q ¤ be the supplier’s optimal
0

quantity to induce, i.e., q ¤ is the solution to ¼ s (q) = 0 and w(q ¤ ) is the supplier’s optimal
wholesale-price contract.
Since qR00 (q) < 0; comparing (10) with (1) immediately reveals that q ¤ < qI . Thus total
supply chain performance is not optimal with the wholesale-price contract. Further, since

5

If R(q) is the revenue function implied by a newsvendor problem, Lariviere and Porteus

(2000) present conditions on the hazard rate of demand for this to be true.
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w(q) is decreasing and R0 (qI ) = c, it follows (not too surprisingly) that the optimal wholesale
price w(q¤ ) is greater than marginal cost, which is in sharp contrast to the optimal wholesale
price under a revenue-sharing contract.
Whether the supplier …nds a wholesale-price contract attractive depends on two factors:
How much the decentralized channel earns and what part of those earnings she captures. A
useful measure of the former is the e¢ciency of the wholesale-price contract:
¼ s (q¤ ) + ¼ r (q ¤ )
;
¦(qI )
The e¢ciency of a contract is the percentage of the optimal pro…t achieved under that
contract. A measure of the latter is the supplier’s pro…t share, which is the ratio of the
supplier’s pro…t to the supply chain’s pro…t, ¼ s (q ¤ )=¦(q ¤ ). A wholesale-price contract is
attractive to the supplier if the e¢ciency and the pro…t share are close to one.
Since the optimal wholesale price is w(q ¤ ) = c ¡ q ¤ R00 (q ¤ ), the curvature of the marginal

revenue curve R0 (q) plays an important role in determining the contract’s e¢ciency and
pro…t share. This is shown in Figure 2. At the optimal solution R0 (q ¤ ) ¡ c = ¡q ¤ R00 (q ¤ );

since R0 (q ¤ ) = w: Thus, in the optimal solution ¡q ¤ R00 (q ¤ ), which is the height of the triangle
label a2 ; equals the height of the rectangle labeled a3 . (The triangle a2 is formed by the
tangent of the marginal revenue curve at q ¤ .) The supplier’s pro…t equals the area of the
rectangle a3 , q ¤ (w(q ¤ ) ¡ c): The triangle a2 is an approximation for the retailer’s pro…t. It

underestimates the retailer’s earnings if R0 (q) is convex and it overestimates the retailer’s
pro…t if R0 (q) is concave. Since the area of the triangle is half of the area of the rectangle, the
supplier’s pro…t share is less (more) than 2=3rds if the marginal revenue is convex (concave).
A similar analysis allows us to estimate the e¢ciency of the system. The loss in supply
chain pro…t from a wholesale-price contract is:
Z qI
(R0 (z) ¡ c) dz:
q¤

The corresponding region is labeled a4 in the diagram. An approximation for this loss is

the triangle formed by dropping the tangent to R0 (q ¤ ) from q¤ down to where it crosses
the horizontal at c. This happens at 2q ¤ . The area of the resulting triangle is again equal
to half of supplier’s pro…t. It is less than the area of a4 if R0 (q) is convex but greater if
R0 (q) is concave. It is straightforward to see that this also implies that q ¤ > qI =2 (< qI =2)
when marginal revenue is concave (convex). Consequently, coordinating the system increases
total pro…t by more (less) than 50% of the supplier’s pro…t if marginal revenue is convex
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(concave). It increases by exactly 50% of the supplier’s pro…t if marginal revenue is linear.
Interestingly, Rentrak, a video-cassette distributor, claims that a retailer should increase
his order quantity by a factor of four when switching from the traditional wholesale-price
contract to their revenue-sharing contract (see www.rentrak.com). If we assume optimal
contracts are implemented, then the marginal revenue curve in that industry must be quite
convex. (Recall that for a linear marginal revenue curve 2q ¤ = qI :) If the marginal revenue
curve is quite convex, then e¢ciency could be substantially lower than 75%. In that case
revenue sharing can signi…cantly increases the pro…t of both …rms in the supply chain.
To illustrate these results, suppose
R0 (q) = 1 ¡ q ® ;
for ® > 0 and q 2 [0; 1]. Such a marginal revenue curve results if, for example, the supply

chain faces a deterministic inverse demand curve P (q) = 1 ¡ q ® = (® + 1). Note that the
marginal revenue curve is convex for ® < 1; linear for ® = 1; and concave for ® > 1.
Furthermore, it satis…es our assumption that R0 (q) + qR00 (q) is decreasing, which guarantees
a unique optimal contract for the supplier. Figure 2 is based on this example.
The optimal quantity for the supplier to induce under a wholesale-price contract is
µ
¶1=®
1¡c
¤
q =
:
1+®

The optimal quantity for an integrated channel is qI = (1 ¡ c)1=® : The resulting pro…ts are
µ
¶µ
¶ 1+®
®
1¡c ®
¤
¼ r (q ) =
1+®
1+®
¶ 1+®
µ
1¡c ®
¼ s (q ¤ ) = ®
1+®
µ
¶
1+®
®
¦(qI ) =
(1 ¡ c) ®
1+®
We see that the pro…t share is (1 + ®)=(2 + ®) and the e¢ciency is
2+®
¼ s (q ¤ ) + ¼ r (q ¤ )
=
1+® :
¦(qI )
(1 + ®) ®
E¢ciency is a decreasing function of ®; i.e., e¢ciency improves as the marginal revenue
curve becomes more concave. As ® ! 0; e¢ciency approaches 2=e ¼ 0:73; and as ® ! 1,
e¢ciency approaches one and the system is coordinated in the limit. However, it approaches
coordination rather slowly. For example, with ® = 10; which is displayed in Figure 3,
e¢ciency is 86% even though the marginal revenue curve is quite concave. What changes
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much more quickly is the pro…t share. At ® = 10, the supplier now captures 91:7% of the
supply chain’s pro…t.
To summarize, the potential pro…t gain from coordination in a supply chain with a single
retailer depends on the shape of the marginal revenue curve. A convex marginal revenue
curve generally leads to worse performance; the decentralized system stocks less than half
of the integrated system quantity and e¢ciency is frequently less than 75%. Supply chain
e¢ciency is generally higher when the marginal revenue curve is concave (although it may
still be less than 90%). We conclude that the gains from coordinating the system decrease
(revenue sharing is less attractive) as the marginal revenue function becomes more concave.
However, implementing revenue sharing may still be worthwhile especially if the supply has
a pre-existing infrastructure to track revenues.
4.1.2

The multiple retailer case

In Section 3.2, we showed that the supplier can coordinate the system with a wholesale-price
contract and earn a positive pro…t. That, however, is not the wholesale-price contract that
would maximize her pro…t. We now explore how supply chain e¢ciency varies with the level
of competition among retailers through an example.
Suppose there are n symmetric retailers and the revenue function in market i for i =
1; : : : ; n is as given in (7). This structure allows two measures of competition, the parameter
¯ and number of retailers n, with an increase in either implying more intense competition.
For a …xed ¯ and n, there is a unique equilibrium such that qiN = (1 ¡ w) = (2 + ¯ (n ¡ 1)) :

q ) = ¡¯qj for all
The integrated channel in contrast has qiI = (1 ¡ c) = (2 + 2¯ (n ¡ 1)). Rji (¹

j 6= i, so the system is coordinated at a price of
¯ (n ¡ 1) (1 ¡ c)
wI = c +
:
2 + 2¯ (n ¡ 1)
One can show that wI is increasing ¯ and n. As competition increases by either measure,
a higher wholesale price is required to moderate competition. Since the total amount the
centralized channel sells for a given ¯ is increasing in n; a greater number of retailers in the
system thus shifts more pro…t to the supplier if she were to price at wI .
The supplier, however, will not price at wI . From her perspective, wI is too low. Somewhat remarkably, her optimal wholesale price w¤ = (1 + c) =2 is independent of both ¯ and
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n.6 The gap between wI and w¤ is (1 ¡ c) = (2 + 2¯ (n ¡ 1)) and drops to zero as n gets
large. Indeed, if ¯ is close to one, the di¤erence between the two wholesale prices is quite
small for even low values of n. This suggests that the supply chain may not su¤er much loss
when the supplier prices to maximize her own pro…t. The e¢ciency of the channel when the
supplier charges w¤ is
1
:
(2 + ¯ (n ¡ 1))2
If ¯ equals zero, the system reduces to n independent linear markets and the e¢ciency of
1¡

the system is 75%. More remarkably, if ¯ > 0, e¢ciency improves rapidly as the number
of retailers increases. For example, if ¯ equals 1=3, then e¢ciency is over 85% with just
three retailers while …ve retailers brings e¢ciency over 90%. Double ¯ to 2=3, and e¢ciency
with three and …ve retailers is 91% and 95:4%, respectively. Tyagi (1999) shows that for
essentially any demand structure the supplier’s pro…t always increases as more Cournot
competitors are added but does not consider the e¢ciency of the supply chain. van Ryzin
and Mahajan (2000) do consider system e¢ciency for an inventory problem in which stocking
levels of substitute products are set by distinct …rms. They similarly …nd that e¢ciency
improves rapidly as the number of competitors increases.
Contrasting this example with that of the single retailer case suggests that competition
in the retail market may have a greater impact on supply chain e¢ciency under a wholesaleprice contract than the nature of the revenue function. Thus revenue sharing should be less
attractive to the supplier when several competitors serve the market. This is particularly
true if there are limited economies of scale in administering revenue sharing so that each
retailer added to the system requires a signi…cant additional administrative cost.
4.2

Retailer e¤ort, moral hazard, and revenue sharing

We now consider another consideration that may work against the use of a revenue-sharing
contract, retailer moral hazard. We have thus far assumed that revenue depends on the retailer’s order quantity and perhaps the retail price. In reality, the retailer in‡uences revenue
through many other actions: e.g., advertising, service quality and merchandizing, to name
just a few. We now consider the impact of those alternative decisions on the e¤ectiveness
6

Tyagi (1999) presents a necessary and su¢cient condition for the supplier’s optimal whole-

sale price to be independent of the number of retailers.
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of revenue-sharing contracts. In particular, we assume that demand is in‡uenced by retailer
e¤ort, which we take as a proxy for a variety of decisions. Naturally, e¤ort is costly; better service and cleaner stores do not come for free. In addition, we assume that e¤ort is
non-contractable, which means that the supplier and the retailer cannot write a contract
that speci…es the retailer’s e¤ort level. Equivalently, we assume that the …rms choose not to
contract on e¤ort because the cost of specifying, monitoring and enforcing retailer e¤ort is
too high. That is a reasonable assumption in our setting because we presume that retailer
e¤ort is the aggregation of many decisions.
Others have examined the impact of retail e¤ort on channel performance. Chu and Desai (1995) study a model in which costly retailer e¤ort improves customer satisfaction, and
higher customer satisfaction has both short and long term bene…ts. Lariviere and Padmanabhan (1997) and Desiraju and Moorthy (1997) examine retailer e¤ort under alternative
information structures. None of these consider revenue-sharing contracts. In the franchising
literature, Lal (1990) has both franchisee and franchisor moral hazard and …nds only the latter warrants the franchisor sharing in the franchisee’s revenue. Gallini and Lutz (1992) and
Desai and Srinivasan (1995) suppose that the franchisee can increase demand and evaluate
the use of revenue sharing as a way for the franchisor to signal private information about
the value of the franchise. None of these papers considers revenue sharing in the absence of
the franchisee paying a lump sum to the franchisor.
4.2.1

Model

We begin with a model similar to the base model of Section 1, except now the retailer chooses
an order quantity q and an e¤ort level e. Decisions are made after observing the terms the
supplier o¤ers, fÁ; wg. Expected revenue is R(q; e), which is continuous, di¤erentiable,
strictly increasing in e, and concave in q. The retailer incurs a cost g(e) to choose e¤ort
level e; where g(e) is continuous, increasing, di¤erentiable and convex with g (0) = 0.
We have already demonstrated that revenue sharing can coordinate a supply chain with
a single retailer and arbitrarily divide pro…ts when demand is independent of retail e¤ort.
We now show that revenue sharing cannot coordinate the channel and allow the supplier a
positive pro…t if retailer e¤ort a¤ects demand. Let ¦(q; e) be the integrated channel’s pro…t
function,
¦(q; e) = R(q; e) ¡ g(e) ¡ qc:
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Suppose the maximization of ¦(q; e) is well behaved and unimodal in q and e. Given that
¦(q; e) is continuous and di¤erentiable, the optimal integrated solution, fqI ; eI g; must satisfy
the …rst order conditions:
@R(qI ; eI )
@¦(qI ; eI )
=
¡c = 0
@q
@q
@R(qI ; eI )
@¦(qI ; eI )
=
¡ g 0 (eI ) = 0
@e
@e
The retailer’s pro…t function is

(11)
(12)

¼ r (q; e) = ÁR(q; e) ¡ g(e) ¡ qw:
Coordination requires that qI be optimal if the retailer chooses e¤ort eI . Under revenue
sharing, that holds when
@R(qI ; eI )
@¼ r (qI ; eI )
=Á
¡ w = 0;
@qI
@q
which, from (11), requires that w = Ác: The coordinating contract thus has not changed,
which is intuitive because we have so far assumed that the retailer’s e¤ort is …xed at the
optimal level. Given the above wholesale price, the retailer’s pro…t function is
¼ r (qI ; e) = ÁR(q I ; e) ¡ g(e) ¡ q I Ác:
The retailer’s pro…t is strictly concave in e; and the optimal e¤ort satis…es the …rst order
condition. But from (12),
@¼ r (q I ; eI )
@R(qI ; eI )
=Á
¡ g 0 (eI ) < 0;
@e
@e
so the retailer’s optimal e¤ort is less than eI if Á < 1. In other words, the retailer chooses
the optimal e¤ort only if Á = 1: In that case the channel is coordinated only if the supplier
sells at marginal cost, leaving her with no pro…t.
Revenue sharing does not coordinate the supply chain because it fails to induce the correct
retailer e¤ort decision. It is useful to contrast this result with those for the price-dependent
newsvendor. There, a revenue-sharing contract coordinates the price and quantity decisions.
The chief di¤erence between the two is that in the price-dependent newsvendor the cost of
expanding demand (foregone revenue on units that would have been sold anyway) is captured
in the revenue function. The supplier then bears her share of the cost. Here, the cost of
expanding demand g (e) falls only on the retailer. As the supplier share of revenue increases,
the retailer’s incentive to exert demand-enhancing e¤ort decreases. Thus, the supplier can
coordinate the channel for a given e¤ort level, but that coordination causes the retailer to
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choose an e¤ort level that is lower than optimal. Coordinating e¤ort is possible if the supplier
could assume part of the e¤ort cost but the retailer then has every reason to misrepresent
the true cost incurred. Corbett and DeCroix (1999) make a similar argument.
4.2.2

What is a supplier to do?

Revenue sharing does not coordinate the supply chain when retail e¤ort matters, but the
supplier only cares about channel coordination indirectly. The supplier’s primary objective
is the maximization of her pro…t. Therefore, the supplier may still o¤er a revenue-sharing
contract if that contract does better than an alternative. The natural alternative is the
standard wholesale-price contract.
To provide tractability, we assume speci…c functional forms for the revenue and e¤ort
cost functions. Suppose the retailer faces the following inverse demand curve7
P (q; e) = 1 ¡ q + 2¿ e
where ¿ 2 [0; 1] is a constant parameter. Retail e¤ort has a greater impact on demand
as ¿ increases. For a given quantity q; the marginal change in the quantity clearing price
with respect to retail e¤ort is increasing in ¿ . Expected revenue is then R(q; e) = qP (q; e).
Suppose the e¤ort cost function is g(e) = e2 . Thus, the retailer’s expected pro…t function is
¼ r (q; e) = ÁR(q; e) ¡ e2 ¡ qw:
The upper bound on ¿ ensures that the problem is jointly concave in q and ¿ .
Let e(q) be the retailer’s unique optimal e¤ort,
e(q) = Á¿ q:
Naturally, the retailer’s optimal e¤ort is increasing in his share of revenue, Á. Given e(q);
the retailer’s pro…t function can be written as
¼ r (q; e(q)) = ¼ r (q) = ÁR(q; e(q)) ¡ e(q)2 ¡ qw
£
¤
= q Á ¡ q(Á ¡ Á2 ¿ 2 ) ¡ w ;

and the optimal quantity is found to be

q(w; Á) =

7

Á¡w
;
2(Á ¡ Á2 ¿ 2 )

Desai and Srinivasan (1995), Lariviere and Padmanabhan (1997), and Desiraju and Moor-

thy (1997) all use functionally equivalent formulations.
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assuming w < Á; otherwise q(w; Á) = 0. Solving for the retailer’s optimal pro…t yields
(Á ¡ w)2
:
4(Á ¡ Á2 ¿ 2 )
The integrated channel solution is obtained from the retailer’s solution with marginal
¼ r (q(w; Á)) =

cost pricing, i.e., w = c and Á = 1. Note that the integrated channel charges a retail price
of
1 + c(1 ¡ 2¿ 2 )
;
2 (1 ¡ ¿ 2 )
which exhibits a peculiar behavior with respect to the cost of production c. The retail price
p
is increasing in the cost of production, as one would expect, if ¿ < 1= 2 but is decreasing in
p
c if ¿ > 1= 2. An increase in the marginal cost has two impacts on the integrated channel’s
pI =

problem. For a …xed e¤ort level, it decreases the quantity at which marginal revenue equals
marginal cost, leading to a higher price. It also induces a lower e¤ort level, resulting in a
smaller market and hence a lower price for any quantity. If the impact of e¤ort is signi…cant
p
(i.e., ¿ > 1= 2), the e¤ort e¤ect dominates the quantity e¤ect, and the retail price falls.
Returning to the decentralized system, the supplier’s pro…t function is
¼s (w; Á) = (1 ¡ Á)R(q(w; Á)) + q(w; Á)(w ¡ c)
The supplier’s pro…t is concave in w,
@ 2 ¼ s (w; Á)
1 ¡ Á (1 ¡ 2¿ 2 )
=
¡
< 0;
@w 2
2Á2 (1 ¡ Á¿ 2 )2
so the optimal wholesale price is
Á ((1 ¡ ¿ 2 ) Á + c(1 ¡ Á¿ 2 ))
:
w(Á) =
1 + Á(1 ¡ 2¿ 2 )
The supplier pro…t function simpli…es to
(1 ¡ c)2
¼ s (w(Á); Á) =
:
4 (1 + Á (1 ¡ 2¿ 2 ))

p
Examining ¼ s (w(Á); Á); one sees that the supplier’s pro…t is increasing in Á if ¿ > 1= 2;

otherwise the supplier’s pro…t is decreasing in Á. Consequently, the optimal contract is a
p
wholesale-price contract (Á = 1) if ¿ > 1= 2, otherwise the supplier’s optimal contract
is a revenue-sharing contract with Á = 0: We again have that e¤ort e¤ects dominate when
p
¿ > 1= 2, and the supplier prefers a wholesale-price contract which minimizes the distortion
in the retailer’s e¤ort decision. In those cases, the supplier prefers a smaller share of a larger
pie. When retail e¤ort has only a minimal impact on demand, quantity e¤ects dominate.
The supplier prefers to use revenue sharing to extra a large share of the supply chain pro…t.
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5.

Discussion

Our analysis demonstrates that revenue sharing is a very attractive contract. Given a single
supplier and retailer it coordinates the supply chain and arbitrarily divides the resulting
pro…ts for essentially any reasonable revenue function. The supplier sells at a wholesale price
below her production cost, but her participation in the retailer’s revenue more than o¤sets
the loss on sales. We have shown that the widely studied buy-back contract of Pasternack
(1985) is a special case of our proportional revenue-sharing contract and that our contract
can coordinate problems that buy backs cannot. In particular, since a coordinating revenuesharing contract is independent of the retail price, it can coordinate a newsvendor problem
with price-dependent demand. We have also addressed competition among retailers, showing
that coordination is still possible although the ability to divide pro…ts may be limited.
With so much going for it, one might argue that revenue sharing should be ubiquitous. We
present some reasons why it is not. First, we try to identify conditions under which the gains
from revenue sharing over a simpler wholesale-price contract may not cover revenue-sharing’s
additional administrative expense. For a bilateral monopoly, we show that the performance
of a wholesale-price contract depends on the shape of the marginal revenue curve and that
the e¢ciency of the system under a wholesale-price contract improves as marginal revenue
becomes more concave. However, even with a concave marginal revenue curve, the gains
from coordination may be substantial. Competition between retailers appears to have a
much greater impact in improving the e¢ciency of the system.
We also demonstrate that the revenue sharing may not be attractive if the retailer’s actions in‡uence demand. Speci…cally, we assume that the retailer can increase demand by
exerting costly e¤ort and that retail e¤ort is non-contractable. Since revenue-sharing contracts reduce the retailer’s incentive to undertake e¤ort relative to a wholesale-price contract,
the supplier may prefer o¤ering a wholesale-price contract. In other words, while revenuesharing contracts are e¤ective at coordinating the retailer’s purchase quantity decision, they
work against the coordination of the retailer’s e¤ort decision. When demand is su¢ciently
in‡uenced by retail e¤ort, revenue-sharing contracts should be avoided.
Other factors beyond those we have considered may in‡uence the decision to o¤er revenue
sharing. In particular, a retailer may carry substitute or complementary products from other
suppliers. If one supplier o¤ers revenue sharing and the other does not in the substitute case,
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the retailer could be predisposed to favor the supplier that allows the retailer to keep all
revenue by, for example, recommending the product to undecided consumers. In the case of
complements (say, personal computers and printers), the retailer may discount the product
o¤ered under revenue sharing to spur sales of the other product. Here revenue sharing may
result in a product being used as a loss leader. We leave these issues to future research.
We began this paper with a discussion of the video cassette rental industry, so we close
with it as well. Our model suggests that in a wholesale-price contract the optimal wholesale
price should be set above marginal cost, but with revenue sharing the wholesale price should
be set below marginal cost. Consistent with that result, the wholesale price in the video
industry fell from $65 per tape to $8 per tape when revenue sharing was introduced. A
wholesale price of $8 is plausibly below marginal cost (production, royalties, transportation,
handling, etc.), so the industry may have adopted a channel coordinating contract.
The adoption of revenue sharing in the video industry is also consistent with the limitations we identi…ed for revenue sharing. The …rst limitation is that administrative costs
should be su¢ciently low. Almost all video stores have systems of computers and bar codes
to track each tape rental, so it should not be di¢cult for the suppliers to monitor and verify
revenues. Further, it is unlikely that retail e¤ort has a su¢cient impact on demand. In a
video rental store, the retailer merely displays boxes of available tapes from which customers
make their selections. Unlike home appliance or automobile retailing (to name just two examples), customers do not make their video selection after substantial consultation with a
retail salesperson (which requires e¤ort). Hence, we feel that the video rental supply chain
is particularly suited for revenue sharing. Although there are limits to these contract, we
suspect that other industries have yet to discover the virtues of revenue sharing.
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Figure 1: A coordinating revenue sharing contract: φ = 1/3
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Figure 2: Optimal Wholesale Price Only Contract with α = 1/4;
efficiency = 74%
Retailer's profit = a 1 + a 2
Supplier's profit = a 3
Optimal profit = a 1 + a 2 + a 3 + a 4
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Figure 3: Optimal Wholesale Price Only Contract with α = 10;
efficiency = 86%
Retailer's profit = a 2
Supplier's profit = a 3
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